Today I received from the excellent USAF Historical Research Agency their meager collection of C-123 Agent Orange documents. We had more USAF documents than did they! However, new to us is the cover memo which went out from the Assistant Surgeon General of the USAF in which he summarizes both the assignment given USAFSAM (USAF School of Aerospace Medicine) and the conclusions reached by his office.
The USAFSAM principal assignment: determine whether exposed veterans would benefit from notification. Notice...not determine whether we'd been exposed, just whether any good would come of notification. Well, duh. Three decades after we retired the C-123 fleet, it would be hard to imagine any benefit, however we could have benefitted back 1994, with strong warnings to reduce fat intake, watch PSAs, etc.
Important: USAFSAM in no way denies that veterans were exposed. Instead, describing any absence of data to determine how much exposure, they guessed (in order to reach accord with the VA) that the exposure was somehow insufficient to cause harm. This conjecture of "insufficient" exposure is disputed head-on by other federal agencies such as the EPA, NIH and CDC, as well as leading scientists and physicians in the field, all of whom conclude veterans were exposed to significant amounts of dioxin, estimated at some amount between the Ranch Hand veterans and troops on the ground in Vietnam.
Further, the USAF states no conclusion could be reached about personal exposures, and then somehow also concludes that whatever exposure was, somehow, minor. How the heck was that conclusion reached?
Then the zinger: "Given the absence of a clear finding of potential harm, we believe it unnecessary to relay such individual findings to persons whom had entered or worked on C-123s between 1972 and 1982, and whom may be unaware of this assessment." I guess the USAF Surgeon General feels patient ignorance is always best, but in any civilian setting the failure to notify a toxin-exposed population of such a likely hazard would be criminal. The Surgeon General instead wants to help us avoid "undue distress!" Imagine a civilian employer deciding not to notify exposed employees to help them avoid undue distress...and perhaps, criminal charges and litegation. This kind of garbage screams out for Feres to be overturned!
Should we read the Assistant Surgeon General's memo as saying he wants to avoid distress to the VA which would have resulted from a more accurate USAFSAM report? Is it somehow helpful to veterans to avoid undue distress by leaving us helpless before the VA's refusal to permit our access to medical care for Agent Orange presumptive illnesses? He says there would not be a helpful recommended action...how about check one's PSA numbers, get into the Agent Orange Registry, and file claims with the VA. Instead, this USAFSAM report itself became the VA's cited authority for denying C-123 veterans' claims!So...somehow this memo describes "an absence of a clear finding of potential harm" even though:1. "heavily contaminated on all surfaces" - USAF C-123 test results, conducted by qualified toxicologists2. "a danger to public health" per sworn testimony of USAF toxicologists3. aircraft all destroyed as toxic waste4. a decision not to notify that is somehow based on USAFSAM "inability to determine how much exposure" and avoidance of distress5. AF officials ordered all aircraft destroyed to prevent veterans learning of the contamination6. USAF Surgeon General in 2000 ordered HAZMAT protection for civilian workers, but not USAF aircrews7. CDC/ATSDR determination veterans were exposed to TCDD8. NIH determination C-123 veterans were exposed to TCDD9. EPA determination C-123 veterans were exposed to TCDD10. scientists and physicians determination veterans were exposed to TCDD
11. key IOM experts (Birnbaum, Stellman, Schecter) determination veterans were exposed to TCDDI doubt the Navy could have any torpedoes left, because the USAFSAM shot them all into us and torpedoed any chance our veterans had to get VA medical care!
Excuse me..I'm going to rest on the living room sofa, contemplate my cancer, heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, peripheral neuropathy, avascular necrosis and other dieases, and luxuriate in the Assistant Surgeon General's decision to help me "avoid distress."
---USAF Assistant Surgeon General Internal Memo re: C-123 Study---
/letterhead/
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCEWASHINGTON DC
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION
FROM: HQ USAF/SG
1780 Air Force Pentagon, 4E114
Washington, DC 20330-1780
SUBJECT: Post Vietnam C-123 Aircraft Agent Orange Exposure
1 May 2012
In 2011, a representative for a group of post Vietnam veterans expressed concern that theveterans whom had worked with C-123 aircraft after the Vietnam War were exposed to AgentOrange and should receive veteran’s benefits for this exposure. He also suggested the UnitedStates Air Force (USAF) may need to notify potentially exposed persons. In response, the AirForce ordered an internal assessment of the matter to determine if any potentially exposed C-123persons would benefit from notification by the Air Force.
The attached consultative memorandum from the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine(USAFSAM) provides the results of an assessment of the currently discernible informationregarding human exposure to residuals of Agent Orange (or Herbicide Orange). The assessmentincludes a review from the period of 1972 through 1982, relative to the possible contact with C-123 aircraft used to spray Agent Orange during the Vietnam War. This assessment wasperformed at the request of the Air Force Surgeon General’s Assistant Surgeon General, HealthCare Operations. The request was made with the intent to ensure a review of all AF exposuredocumentation, quantify (if possible) the different human exposures (e.g. aircrew, maintainers,air evacuation patients, passengers, etc...), and enable a determination of whether or not the AirForce should contact previously exposed persons to inform them of a risk to their health.
As per the attached assessment, there was no relevant personal exposure or laboratorydata found. Area air samples were within recommended limits (then and present day) perOccupational Safety and Health Administration guidance. Swipe samples identified AgentOrange components, to include 2,3,7,8 Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD). USAFSAMdetermined existing information is inadequate to accurately determine individual exposureconcentrations and quantities for the period in question. The assessment also concluded it isunlikely that the exposures experienced between 1972 and 1982 would have been sufficient tocause harm.
Upon review of the attached assessment and following discussion with Air Force subject matterexperts, it appears reasonable to conclude the exposures of concern were unlikely to have causedharm. Given the absence of a clear finding of potential harm, we believe it unnecessary to relaysuch individual findings to persons whom had entered or worked on C-123s between 1972 and
1982, and whom may be unaware of this assessment. Such a notification could cause unduedistress and would provide a limited benefit, as there would not be a recommended action.
Please direct any questions concerning this matter to my action officers, Col JamesBennion (MD, MPH) and Col Richard Ashworth (PhD) at 703-588-6435.
/signed/
Attachments:
1. Distribution List
2. USAFSAM Consultative Letter
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